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The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes:

Postwar Japan

by
Hugh T. Patrick

In September 1945, and indeed for close to a decade thereafte r, no one
could conceive that by the late 1960 1 s Japan would be not only the strongest
nation in Asia but the third largest industria l power in the world, and a major
ally of the United States and its second largest trading partner, after Canada.
For Japan was utterly defeated in World War II, crushed militaril y and econo
mically, and with its ideologic al foundatio ns of romantic tradition alism, ex-
pansionism and nationalis m fully discredit ed.

Major citied were in rubble and

their populatio ns dispersed throughou t the countrysi de.

The purpose of this

essay is to describe Japan's resurgenc e to the forefront of the world's nations.
Japan lost in World War II almost three million people, its Empire of
Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and various mandated territori es and one--quar ter of
its capital stock of machines, equipmen t, buildings and houses.

This included

virtually all its merchant shipping and textile equipmen t, the maJor prewar
industry.

Not all was due to the direct destructio n of war; in the last des

perate days textile spindles were taken out of factories and melted down as
scrap to make munitions .
ance.

Equipment had deteriora ted due to lack of mainten

Probably more important , soil fertility had declined sharply from the

virtual cessation of chemical and other fertilize r inputs.

Acute shortages

of goods and bottlenec ks, combined with deficit financing and immense bank
note issue at war-end, were to provide the basis for a rampant inflation that
was to plague Japan throughou t the immediate postwar years.
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Moreover, Japan was subject to military occupation by the victorious
Allies, to which the populace initially looked with natural great trepidation .
As it turned out, the Occupation was perhaps the greatest social experiment
ever attenpted.

Highly idealistic and ambitious, the fundamental objective was

to recreate Japan as a democratic society---no t simply in political and economic
institution s and in the sources and balances of power, but even in values and
ideology.

For all the inefficienc ies, even mistakes, and for all the altera

tions the Japanese have made since the Occupation ended, any overall assess
ment must conclude that the Occupation was highly successful.
This success was possible only because the Japanese wanted it so.

Most

of the seeds of change fell on fertile ground; those that did not have ulti'"
mately fared :Car less well.

It was not simply Japanese cooperation with the

Occupationa ires--though that was essential--b ecause the changes that come about
have been far too great and lasting for that.
point of view the goal was not solely

11

Nonetheless , from the Japanese

democratiza tion'.•:

for most people in

the irr.mcdiate postwar years the most immediate problem was simply how to sur
vive, how to meet the pressing material needs for food, clothing, shelter.
As conditions gradually became better, such economic objectives continued to
loom large for both individual family and nation.

Indeed, the pursuit of

rapid economic growth and rising living standards has remained predominant in
Japan's postwar national objectives.

And success in the economic sphere has

been a necessary requisite of Japan's continued democratiza tion and of its re•
surgence as a world power.

Accordingly , this essay focusses mainly on Japan's

economic performance in arising, like the legendary phoenix, from the ashes
of World War II.

I.

From Oc~tation to Restoration of Sovereignty.
The Occupation of Japan was essentially an American operation) even though

policy was nominally determined by the eleven-power Far Eastern Commission in
Washington.

General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Ailied Powers-

SCAP, which referred both to MacArthur and to the administrative bureaucracy
of the Occupation--by dint of personal authority and personality wielded con~
siderable decision-making power in addition to overseeing the implementation of
policy.

SCAP worked through the Japanese government using rather than replacing

it, by means of formal directives and informal, continuous guidance.the SCAP staff was American.

Most of

They encompassed a wide range of military and

civilian skills and attitudes and values, from fervent New Dealers to conserva-
tive businessmen.
Quite naturally the immediate Occupation objective was to demilitarize
Japan, first by destroying all armaments, halting all military production, by
physically taking control of the entire country, by purging military, political~
and business leaders, and by punishing those tried and found guilty as war
criminals.

In the longer-run context this was meant to destroy the economic

and political bases of military strength, and to curtail the willingness to
use war as an instrument of national policy.
feeling colored policy at the beginning:

A rather considerable punitive

Japan deserved its plight, which was

the outcome of its unpardonable aggression against others; it should be expected
to pay for the damage it had done.

Nonetheless, mere retribution never domi

nated policy, and soon was submerged in the zeal for reform.

The shifting

policy regarding reparations payments for damage done to Allied nations is

indicative of changing attitudes.
The sum of the claims of the Allied nations was huge.

It was soon de-

cided that Japan could not afford payments from current production, but that
much of her industrial capacity--espe cially iron and steel, machinery, and
chemicals-•-was war-related and hence ;;surplus" so that it could be dismantled
and shipped to damaged neighbors.

It was difficult to decide exactly what was

surplus, since in fact any reduction in capacity slowed Japan's ability to
support itself economically.

At first "surplus 11 was defined as any plant and

equipment beyond that needed to maintain a standard of living equal to that
in the countries Japan had occupied; soon this was amended to Japan's prewar

(1934-36) standard. The United States quickly realized it would ultimately
have to foot the reparations bill, sending in aid goods as Japan sent repara•
tions out.

The U.S. renounced its claim to reparations and put pressure, not

entirely successfully, on others to do so as well.

The wrangling delayed the

first shipments of industrial equipment as reparations until 1947, by which
time a series of U.S. special missions were drastically scaling down this pro
gram.

The cumulative total value of shipments, until the end of the repara

tions payments under Occupation auspices in 1950, was less than $50 million
one-~fifteenth of that programmed in 1947.
A fundamental premise of SCAP was that only if Japan were democratized
could it become a peaceful, useful member of the world community of nations.
As a democracy Japan would not want to be aggressive, to wage war; moreover
democracy was a desired end in itself.

Demokurashii soon became a slogan word

in Japan, with a bewildering variety of connotations to the enthusiastic but
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often perplexed Japanese man in the street.

Was it more democratic for a man

sitting on a crowded streetcar to offer his seat to a woman, because of the
raised status of the female, or not to offer his seat on the ground that men
and women were equally entitled to the seat?
Nonetheless, the political institutions and behavior of a democratic
society were obvious enough, and were soon established--institutions first,
though behavior has not always followed, and certainly not always in the ways
Americans would expect.

Restrictions on political, civil, and religious

liberties were removed 1 and rights guaranteed.
Shinto religion.

State was separated from the

Universal suffrage was extended to women.

nobility, with aristocratic titles, was eliminated.

The system of

The Emperor was replaced

by parliament as the core of the political system; he renounced any claims to
divinity and was reduced to a (continuingly popular) symbol of state.
The establishment of parliamentary democracy was an essential feature
of the entire process.

Both the House of Representatives and House of Coun

cillors were elected; most power resided in the former (the Lower House).
The country was governed by a prime minister and his cabinet elected by par
liament (the Diet).

Political parties were quickly re-established; they

covered a spectrum extending all the way to the Japan Communist Party.
Many of these changes were embodied in the 1947 Constitution, the basic
law of the nation.

This is one of the most idealistic constitutions in the

world in the political, social, and economic rights it guarantees the citizens
of Japan.

This idealism is manifested also in Article 9 which renounces the

use of war or the maintenance of armed forces.

The sweeping changes embodied

-6in the 1947 Constitu tion were very much the conseque nce of American instigat ion.
When the rather conserv ative Japanese Cabinet came up in 1946 with proposa ls
for constitu tional revision they did not involve signific ant changes .

MacArthur

then had his staff draw a model document which became the basis of the new Con
stitutio n.

Despite the awarene ss by the general public of the American origins

of their Constit ution, it has been and is widely accepted .

In recent years

Conserv ative elements have urged constitu tional amendment mainly to elimina te
Article 9 and to raise the position (if not the power) of the Emperor somewhat,
but without success .
The Constitu tion is the politica l and legal manifes tation of the changes
in values and social relation s for which SCAP aimed:

the replacem ent of authori 

tarianis m and paternal ism with equality and individu alism.

Changes in the

educatio nal system were also designed to promote new values.

The mytholog y of

Imperia l divinity , coupled with the romantic nationa listic views of the special world
role of the chosen Japanese people, was denigra ted, as were the military .

While

there is less stress to conform than earlier , and some increase in individu alism, nonethe less these themes are rather alien to as group-o riented a society
as Japan's , so that it still remains a collect ivistic society.

The people con

tinue to have a highly develope d awarene ss of self and nation as uniquely
Japanes e.

When children the world over were asked "what are you? 11 the most

common response was

11

a human being, 11 a "child/ 1 or a

Japan the overwhelming response was "a Japanes e. 11

11

boy 11 or a

11

girl. 71

In

Yet the primacy of tradi-

tional ideals of loyalty to, and self-sac rifice for, the nation

has receded .

In its place the improvement of materia l well-be ing and the enjoyme nt of life
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have assumed much grea ter imp orta nce in
the goa ls of most Japa nese .
The dem ocra tiza tion effo rts invo lved maj
or economic refo rms . It was
d~emed esse ntia l for democracy in Japa n
to esta blis h a com peti tive economy with
a more equ al dist ribu tion of power and
a rela tive ly ega lita rian , wide dis tri
buti on of inco me, wea lth, and own ersh ip
of the means of prod ucti on and trad e.
Gra dual ly it came to be real ized also that
thes e inst itut ion al and red istr ibu 
tive chan ges were not enough: economic
reco nstr ucti on and sati sfac tory econ o
mic grow th, resu ltin g in pro spe rity and
risi ng leve ls of livi ng, prov ided the
only economic envi ronm ent in whic h inci
pien t democracy coul d be nurt ured
The appr oach to buil ding a com peti tive
economy was to brea k up conc en
trat ion s of economic power by bus ines s
and land lord s, and to deve lop new
cou nter vail ing power base s among ind ustr
ial wor kers , and tena nt and othe r sma ll
fann ers. Perh aps the most thor oug h refo
rm was that of farm land own ersh ip.
Japa n had long been , and stil l is, a cou
ntry of inte nsiv ely cult ivat ed
fmu ily farm s of min iatu re ( 2 1/2 acre aver
age) size , brok en down into even
sma ller, non -con tigu ous, plo ts.

Prio r to refo rm, less than 10 perc ent of
farm

land was in hold ings of 125 acre s or mor
e.

Ten antr y was wid espr ead; abou t 45

perc ent of the land was farmed by tena nts.

Two -fift hs of the farm fam ilies

cml tiva ted land part of which they owne
d and par t of whic h they rent ed, one
thir d owned esse ntia lly all the ir own land
, whi le one -qua rter were esse ntia lly
tena nts, cult ivat ing almo st sole ly land
rent ed from othe rs. Lan dlor ds, mai nly
loca l resi den ts, were rela tive ly wea lthy
, pow erfu l, pate rna list ic, and tra
diti ona l. Lan dlor d-te nan t prob lems had
become exac erba ted duri ng the inte rwa r
peri od. Land refo rm prog rams had been
plan ned , but nev er imp leme nted , by the
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Japanese bureaucracy earlier.

SCAP thus served as the catalytic agent, rather

than originating a new idea, while also prompting a stronger reform than other
wise might have occurred.
The basic aim was simple:

to end tenantry by transfer of land ownership

to farming tenants from their landlords.

The method was land purchase and

sale, under government auspices, not confiscation.
to be fairly compensated:

In principle landlords were

land values were determined on the basis of 1945

official prices, and payment was partly in cash, partly in low-interest, thirty
year bonds.

Tenant purchasers were extended easy payment terms.

By the time

the actual transactions took place, between 1947 and 1949, inflation had re
duced the real value of the transaction price to only one percent of prewar
land prices.
The land reform virtually eliminated farm tenantry and landlordism.
Maximum farm size was restricted to 7,5 acres (30 acres in Hokkaido), well
above the actual average.

Change in ownership did not mean much change in the

organization of production; it remained family farms.

The new owners did have

greater incentive to invest in land improvements~ and in this were much en
couraged by the relatively high demand and thereby prices for foodstuffs.
Agriculture was the first sector to achieve prewar living standards and has
continued to prosper.

Consequently, the goal of a sturdy farm family, inde

pendent of landlord control, has been achieved.
not quickly change however:

Old patterns and values do

farmers remain the most conservative political

force in Japan.
A second mass base for power to compete against the established power
of business and government bureaucracy (it being clear that the military were
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to be eliminated as a power group) were industrial workers.

A major objective

of SCAP policy was to develop a strong, independent trade union movement.

The

pertinent SCAP section was staffed by many American union leaders of very
liberal persuasion.

Even so it is unlikely that they anticipated the rapidity

and enthusiasm with which unionizatio n swept Japan, or the highly political
course unionism was to take at the national level.
enterprises of any size.

Unions were formed in most

By 1950,56 percent of industrial employees were

unionized, a high-water level that has receded to about 35 percent,thou gh ab
solute membership continues to rise.

Initially membership included top and

middle management (after all, that seemed most democratic) but this soon ended
as unions settled into bargaining with management for employee benefits.

Most

bargaining on economic issues began and has continued to be at the individual
firm level, so that Japan has been characterize d as having enterprise unionism.
Industry-wi de bargaining remains the exception, though national federations of
unions have increasingl y attempted, in annual

ii

spring offensives, 11 to use lead

ing industries to establi~h patterns of wage increases which can serve as the
basis of negotiation by other industries and individual enterprise unions.
Many individual unions at the firm level joined into industry-wi de
organizatio ns; most of these in turn joined one of several national federations .
Unionism at the national level has been highly political:

they have tended to

stress political more than economic objectives, have been highly active politi
cally, and have provided the main support for the moderate--to -extreme left
political parties.

The emphasis on politics was in large part a response to

the depth and rapidity of economic, political, and social change in postwar
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Japan.

It also reflects the nature of the origina l (and continui ng) union

leadersh ip at the nationa l level.

Most were leftists who had

been active in

the prewar labor movement, had been imprison ed in the late 1930's and early
1940 1 s for refusing to recant and, followin g Japan's defeat emerged from prison
as about the only heroic figures around (in both Japanese and American eyes).
These men quickly took charge of the nascent union movement, and imparted to
its nationa l organiz ations the politica l focus which has been dominan t.
While building a strong union movement and an egalitar ian agricult ure
and disbandi ng the military , SCAP aimed both at reducing the concent ration of
business power and establis hing a competi tive business environm ent.
and institut ional arrangem ents were reasona bly clear.

The legal

What was much more dif

ficult-- and never success fully achieved -- was to obtain widespre ad Japanese
business and governm ent bureauc racy acceptan ce of the concept and ideology of
free competi tion as inheren tly socially benefic ial.
accepted the view that the Adam Smithian

11

Most Japanese have never

invisib le hand 11 would automat ically

guide the selfish , profit--m aximizin g behavio r of firms and optimiz ing behavio r
of individu als to the maximum output and lowest prices for the benefit of con
sumers.

Rather, they have historic ally accepted the

11

visible hands" of govern

ment guidance and of business coopera tion (in cartels and otherwi se) to attain
satisfac tory economic performa nce,
costs of a competi tive system:

The Japanese place more emphasis on the

possible over-ca pacity and misallo cations in

specific industr ies, and attendan t cyclica l fluctuat ions in business activity .
They frequen tly term as "excess competi tions" situatio ns which in the United
States would be regarded simply as intense , but not undesir able, degrees of
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competition.

Because the ideology of free competition has not become ingrained

in Japan (aside from the issue as to how extensively it is really practiced in
Western nations), the Occupation reforms in the business sector were eroded
more than elsewhere in the economy.

But this moves us ahead of our story;

first, the reforms themselves.
A variety of interrelated reforms were undertaken:

dissolution of the

zaibatsu conglomerates; elimination of cartels and monopolies; brealc-up of ex
tremely large firms; and enactment of rules of fair play in business.

This

last included anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation, prohibition of unrea
sonable restraints on trade, production, sales or pricing, and establishment
of the Fair Trade Commission to monitor and enforce these rules.
Zaibatsu dissolution was the most thoroughly implemented and lasting of
the reforms.

The zaibatsu--of which the four largest were Mitsui, Mitsubishi,

Yasuda, and Sumitomo--were family-owned conglomerates, usually through a hold-
ing company, of firms operating in mining, manufacturing, commerce, banking,
and insurance on a highly interrelated basis:

buying from, selling to, finan

cing, insuring, and handling the sales of, each other.

They had amassed great

wealth, economic and political power, and inevitably were completely involved
in the wartime economy.
There were two strands in the reform:

r8moval of the zaibatsu families

from ownership, control, or position; and dissolution of the conglomerates.
The holding companies were ended, and all shares in the underlying companies
owned by zaibatsu family members were confiscated and sold both to employees
of the constituent firms (about one-quarter of the shares) and gradually, in
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the open market, to large numbers of middle-income Japanese.

The zaibatsu

families received in compensation bonds which bore no interest and which could
not be sold or redeemed for 10 years.

All family members were purged, so they

could not work for the firms they formerly had owned.

All this was so effec

tive that the families have never been able to return to power; by and large
they have slipped into comfortable obscurity, at least in terms of economic
and political power if not social status.
The break-up of the zaibatsu conglomerates was less easy.
locking directorships and stock-holding came to an end.

All inter

Subsidiaries and af

filiates were spun off to be separate, independent companies.

A few very large

zaibatsu firms, particularly the trading companies, were broken down into
separate companies; for example, Mitsubishi Trading Company was divided into
about a hundred small trading companies.

However, the established buying

selling-financi ng-trading patterns remained, so that ex-zaibatsu firms have
continued to do business with each other extensively.
Oroginally, zealous to establish a competitive environment (and perhaps
with punitive motives), SCAP considered some 1,200 operating companies for
break-up into smaller units.

Personnel in the SCAP sections for industry and

finance had come primarily from American business and banking; they were some
what less inclined to

11

New Deal 11 measures than their labor counterparts.

Prob

ably more important, it was felt that too much splitting up of Japanese com
panies would retard economic recovery, and recovery came to be an increasingly
important objective after the first two years of Occupation.
of companies designated for

11

reorganization" had shrunk to 325.

By 1948 the list
In fact, only

-13-

28 companies were ultimately broken up, and 10 of these were in electric power.
These reforms did much to redistribute income, wealth, and ownership of
the means of production as well as provide bases of countervailing power in a
relatively more competitive economy.

The wealthy owners of large corporations

were also hurt by the great corporate losses due to bombing, deterioration,
reparations and government repudiation (at SCAP insistence) of its guarantees
on loans made to firms for war production.

The tax system was also used to re

structure the distribution of income and wealth.

In 1946 sharply progressive

special taxes were levied on war profits and on wealth.
through reforms of the tax system.

In 1949 SCAP pushed

Much greater emphasis was placed on direct

taxes, at progressive rates, on personal and corporate incomes, and less on
sales and other indirect taxes which tended to be regressive.

Local govern

ments were given greater autonomy, including a larger tax base and an automatic
share in certain taxes collected at the central level.

While many of the spe

cific reforms were weakened, and even the role of direct taxes and of local
autonomy eroded, in general the new tax system remained even after the Occupa
tion ended.
By far the most important, if somewhat erratic and untended, means of

redistributing income and wealth was inflation.
had built up during the war.

Strong inflationary pressures

They were exacerbated by government heavy deficit

financing and extensive money creation via the Reconstruction Finance Bank,
which readily made loans to industries essential for reconstruction--coal, fer
tilizer, electric power, transport, iron and steel--using funds obtained by
selling its bonds to the Bank of Japan, the central bank.

Thus the price level,
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taken as 1 in 1934-36, was 9 times higher at the end of 1945, 145 times at the
end of 1947, and about 300 times higher in 1949, when the inflation was finally
halted as part of the Dodge Plan reforms.

Some inflation was inevitabl e, given

the exigencie s of postwar shortages and bottlenec ks.

However, a combinati on of

wage, price, budget, and bank credit controls could have halted the inflation
sooner.

SCAP at first was unwilling to take responsi bility for economic policy,

and then was slow in developin g effective anti-infla tionary measures.
The Japanese government adopted a rather non--coop erative and even decep
tive attitude toward attempts to halt the inflation .

It is probably too extreme

to say that the Japanese government had a deliberat e policy to undermine the
Occupatio n reforms, and to shift the burden of support of the economy to the
United States by making aid imports essential since exports were uncompet i
tively priced.

In large part the Japanese government attitude reflected the

high priority it attached to economic recovery even at the expense of infla
tion; it wanted to be sure resources were attracted to essential industrie s
and loans seemed the easiest way to accomplis h that.

Moreover, anti-infl a

tionary measures were bound to hurt, and the party in power would lose popular
support.

Big business had immense wartime loans to repay to banks with the

governmen t no longer guarantee ing the loans, business benefitte d from being
able to raise the prices of its goods and from repaying the loans with money
of sharply reduced purchasin g power.

Business did suffer from sharply reduced

depreciat ion charges, in real terms, for its plant and equipmen t, but this was
eventuall y remedied when firms were allowed to increase the book value of
assets in line with the post-infl ation price level.

-15-

Inflati on hurt holders of bonds, deposi ts, and other fixed- interes t
financ ial claims , rent recipie nts, pensio ners, and to some extent wage earners
becaus e of the lagged adjustm ent of wages to prices in the spiral upward
s.
Particu larly hit were agraria n ex-land lords and zaibats u familie s, since
they
were stuck with non-sa leable bonds whose purcha sing power value decline d
to
only about five percen t of their initia l value.

In contra st , the ex--ten ants

and other landow ners, owners of corpor ate shares , and owners of other real
assets did not suffer , and in some cases benefi tted, from inflati on since
the
prices for their assets increas ed at least as rapidly as the genera l price
level.
Why did the Japane se accept , or at least tolera te, these strikin g changes
in income distrib ution, owners hip of assets, and politic al power?

By and large

these represe nted transfe rs from a small minori ty to a large majori ty of
the
Japane se, who quite natura lly respond ed favorab ly,

The previou s holders of

power and wealth were under attack --polit ically, econom ically, sociall y--so
they were not able to sustain their vested intere sts.

Finally , because Japan

was utterly defeate d and close to chaos, tremend ous sacrifi ces could be
de
manded of everyon e simply to get the country back on its feet.
The assump tion underly ing initia l Allied occupa tion economic policy was
that Japan had brough t the devast ation upon itself, so it had to suffer
the
conseq uences, and had no right to expect outside assista nce in economic
re
covery .

In practic e howeve r, from the beginn ing SCAP could not remain com

pletely aloof of economic recons tructio n problem s and issues.

The difficu l

ties were simply too great, Japan was one of the most devasta ted of all
the
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World War II countries .

Industria l productio n in 1946 was only one-fifth of

the wartime peak, and one-third of the 1934-36 level.

Agricultu ral productio n

was also off some two-fifth s, a less extensive but more serious decline.

By

early 1946 Japan was on the verge of starvatio n.
To prevent "disease and unrest 11 General MacArthur prevailed upon Washing
ton to begin large-sca le aid shipments of food and medical supplies.

Moreover,

it was soon apparent that a requisite for successfu l political democrat ization
was an adequate economic base--rec onstructi on and satisfact ory economic pro
gress.

U.S. aid was essential to achieve this.

The compositi on of aid changed

gradually from food to fertilize r, petroleum , and industria l materials such as
cotton.

By 1949, when the aid program was drawing to a close, the U.S. had

provided Japan a total of al.most $2 billion in aid.

Aid paid for 38 percent of

Japan's imports during the Occupatio n--a period when Japan's export earnings
were negligibl e because of loss of prewar markets and lack of productiv e ca
pacity to produce exports.
ly modest:

In per capita terms U.S. aid to Japan was relative

$27 for Japan, as compared with $77 for West Germany, $51 for Italy,

$122 for the United Kingdom, and $103 for France.

Legally this aid was a loan

rather than a gift, to the eventual surprise of most Japanese and Americans .
In the late 1950's Japan agreed, based on the formula worked out in similar
negotiati ons between the United States and West Germany, to repay the aid at
the rate of about 25 cents on the dollar.
SCAP and U.S. concern for economic reconstru ction deepened as the world
environme nt changed and perceptio ns altered as to how Japan might best fit into

it.

By 1948 the cold war with Russia had divided the world, and China could
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no longer be relied upon as the stabilizing influence in Asia as had been
earlier hoped.

Japan app~ared increasingl y to be the most viable possibility

among major Asian nations of becoming a stable democracy~ strong economy, and
close ally oi' the West .

.American policy moved far from punishment of Japan and

keeping Japan weak in competition with its neighbors, to regarding Japan as the
11

workshop of Asia 11 and good friend of the United States.
The effect of this shift in attitude was increasing emphasis in Occupa

tion economic policy upon recovery and decreasing emphasis upon reform.

The

land and labor reforms had already been completed, but the break-up of large
industrial and financial enterprises other than zaibatsu holding companies and
of their buying and selling interrelatio nships had really only begun.

The

quite ambitious SCAP industrial reform program was allowed to wither away in
its implementat ion, as already noted, since most companies could correctly
point to retardation of their recovery if they were to be split up or other
wise disrupted.

In a sense the longer-run reform goals gave way to the more

immediate tasks of recovery.
In growth rate terms recovery was rapid, but it was from such a low

1945-1946 base (when output was probably at a level not above that prior to
World War I! ) that even rapid rates of improvement were insufficien t to re
construct the economy quickly.

Not until 1954 or 1955 was Japan able to

attain prewar per capita levels of productivit y, national income and per
sonal consumption .

In crude economic terms Japan lost 18 years of economic

growth in embarking on its disastrous World War II adventure; it took that
long to come back up to the prewar level.

-18 -

Thu s, Jap an was sti ll a ver y wea
k cou ntry when the All ied nat ion
s agr eed
in 1951 to end the Occ upa tion and
to res tor e sov ere ign ty to Jap an
by sig nin g a
pea ce tre aty . Ac tua lly Gen era l
MacArthur had sug g.es ted thi s cou
rse as ear ly as
1947. Asi de from con tinu ing pro
blem s wit hin Jap an of refo rm and
rec ove ry, the
inc rea sin g int ens ity of the col d
war , the har den ing ant i-co mm uni st
pos itio n of
the Uni ted Sta tes , and Ru ssi a's
unw illi ngn ess to agr ee to a pea ce
tre aty wer e
all fac tor s in the slow nes s in end
ing the Occ upa tion . The out bre ak
of the
Korean War in Jun e 1950 mar ked a
de fac to end ; American atte nti on
foc uss ed on
Korea and SCAP tur ned ove r res pon
sib ilit y for dom esti c aff air s to
the Jap ane se
government. It als o int ens ifie d
the American res olv e to hav e a pea
ce tre aty
sig ned , and it pre ssu red its We
ster n and Asi an all ies to agr ee.
The Pea ce Tre aty was sig ned on Sep
tember 8, 195 1, and went int o eff
ect
on Ap ril 28, 195 2, when Jap an was
onc e aga in (le gal ly at lea st) an
ind epe nde nt
nat ion . Rus sia and Communist Chi
na ref use d to par tic ipa te. Rus sia
and Jap an
sig ned a tre aty in 195 4, res tor ing
nor mal , if coo l, rel ati ons mar red
by Jap an' s
tie wit h the We st, and dis put es
abo ut con tinu ing Rus sian con tro l
ove r two
sma ll isla nds jus t nor th of Hokkaid
o and fish ing rig hts in adj ace nt
wa ters .
China and Jap an hav e not yet nor
ma lize d rel atio ns (as of mid -19 68)
. Oth er
Asi an nat ion s sig ned the Pea ce Tre
aty , but sev era l--n ota bly Burma,
Ind one sia ,
and the Phi lipp ine s--r efu sed to
acc ept a cla use in whi ch the y gav
e up rig hts
to rep ara tion s. An imp orta nt fea
tur e of Jap an' s for eig n pol icy in
Asi a in the
195 0' s was neg otia tion s wit h the
nat ion s on rep ara tion s ; set tlem ent
s were con-
elu ded in all cas es. While the
Pea ce Tre aty rec ogn ize d Jap an' s
res idu al sov er
eig nty ove r Okinawa and the oth er
Ryukyu isla nds , and ove r Iwo Jim
a and the
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other Bonin islands, the United States retained the right to occupy and adminis-
ter them so long as its security requirements necessitated.

The Japanese de-

sire to resume full sovereignty, particularly over Okinawa, has been an in
creasingly important issue during the 1960 1 s.

The return of the Bonins in 1968

did little to resolve the issue.
The Peace Treaty did not mean that Japan was immediately or automati
cally accepted back into the community of nations.

In 1952 Japan was still

weak:

the standard of living was low (gross national product per capita was
about $250 dollars), 1 still below the prewar level; its foreign trade was far

below prewar levels yet the needs for imports were and would continue to be
acute; it had virtually no means of defense from external aggression; it still
had relatively little self-confidence.

It faced a world beset with its own

postwar adjustment problems, hostile or at best indifferent to Japan.

It was

clear to Japanese leaders that the country needed a sponsor in its inter
national political, economic, and security relations.

A neutralist policy of

going-it-alone would have been very difficult and probably not very fruitful.
It was natural, perhaps inevitable under the circumstances, that Japan
should turn to the United States for this support.

The United States was

anxious to establish an alliance with Japan and willing to support it in the
international arena; it was clearly the strongest nation in the world; it
was by far Japan's largest trading partner (almost one-thirs of exports and
1Measured in 1960
Japanese prices and converted at the official exchange
rate; as is true of other low-income countries conversion of local currency
into dollars in terms of real purchasing power would yield a considerably-
perhaps 50 percent--higher figure.
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imports, eight times greater than Japan's next trading partner.) Moreover, with
the strong .American presence in Japan despite the ending of the Occupation, it
is not clear that Japan really had any other viable alternative s, even though
Prime Minister Yoshida and the other leaders may not have felt the need for such
alternative s.

It is perhaps in the context of a partnership between an omni

potent nation and a weak but willing nation that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,
signed at the same time as the Peace Treaty, should be appraised.

Under this

arrangement the United States guaranteed Japan's security from external attack
and was allowed to maintain bases and military forces, but not nuclear weapons,
in Japan.
In terms of Japan's self-intere sts, its alliance with the United States
and the West has paid off handsomely.

The United States sponsored Japan's

entry in 1955 into the United Nations and such affiliates as the Internation al
Monetary Fund and World Bank, into GATT (the world trade organizatio n), and
in the early 1960 1 s into OECD.

This sponsorship , together with Japan's own

strenuous efforts, enabled Japan to dissipate, or at least substantial ly miti
gate the hostilities and discriminat ory measures of other nations.

By the

early 1960's, if not sooner, Japan was recognized and accepted as a major
nation.
The economic payoff was perhaps even greater.

Japan benefitted from

U.S. Korean War special procurement dollar expenditure s, and from continuing
access to .America's rapidly growing import market (despite recurrent irritants
over U.S. textile and other commodity import restriction s), and to the U.S.
short-term and long-tenn private capital markets.

The U.S. security umbrella
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meant that Japan did not have to devote much of its resources for defense,
utilizing them instead for growth-producing investment and rising living stan
dards.
Of course the alliance with the United States has not been without its
costs.

Japan was committed to following pretty much the U.S. line in inter

national affairs.

Until the late 1950 1 s its trade with China was severely

restricted, more so than for European nations though less than the American
total boycott.

Japan has not followed the subsequent lead of European nations

in making long-term export credits available to China, no doubt in large part
due to American pressure (the American position is that it does not see why
Japan should have easy, even preferable, access to loan funds if Japan is going
in effect to relend them to China).
Most important, as Japan's remarkable economic performance of the 1950's
continued in the 1960 1 s it no longer remained a weak client needing paternal
istic U.S. sponsorship.

The evolving relative power position of Japan and the

United States has brought new strains as well as opportunities to the alliance.
Japan quite naturally has wanted greater independence, and more equal partner
ship.

The nature of Japan's economic performance since the eQd of the Occupa

tion hence is the next matter for consideration.
\

II.

The Economic Miracle:

From Reconstruction to Super-fast Growth

Japan's growth rate of national income between 1946 and 1954 of 10.8
percent was rapid, but wa~ from the early postwar extremely low base.

It

represented little more than eliminating bottlenecks, restoring partially

-22-

damaged existing capacity to operation, and returning to prewar levels of pro
ductivity and per capita income.

Similar patterns of reconstruction and rapid

growth occurred during the same period in Europe, notably in West Germany.
Once recovery was completed, there seemed to be no reason to expect continued
rapid growth.

Indeed, in a 1956 governmental five-year projection 6.5 percent

was regarded as the maximum sustainable growth rate.
In fact the Japanese economy has continued its rapid surge of growth
right to the present, at a rate far faster than that of virtually any other
country in the world, communist, democratic, or autocratic.

Between 1954 and

1967 Japanese gross national product (GNP), measured in constant prices to
adjust for the mild inflationary trend, grew at an average annual rate of 10.1
percent, almost three times as fast as the growth of the American economy for
the same period.

The power of compound interest is such that in 1967 Japan's

GNP was 3 1/2 times larger than it was in 1954.
leled in history.

This performance is unparal

It brought Japan from a populous but relatively weak nation

in the mid 1950's to the forefront of world powers by the late 1960 1 s.

I con

sider some of the implications of this performance in the next section.

First,

it is desirable to examine the changing structure of the economy,cyclic al
fluctuation, and the causes of the exceptional growth performance.
The most important change in the structure of production is the rising
relative share of manufacturing and construction from about 28 percent in the
early 1950's to 35 percent in the mid 1960 1 s, and a concomitant decline in
agriculture, forestry and fishing from 22 percent to less than 12 percent.
Yet agricultural performance generally has been very good, certainly better
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than prewa r.

Rice remain s the single most impor tant crop.

Better seeds, more

fertil izers , and insect icides have raised outpu t, partic ularly in
the 1950' s.
Agric ulture is becoming more divers ified in respon se to rising consum
er demands
for vegeta bles, fruits , dairy produ cts and meat. However, the growth
of labor
produ ctivity in agricu lture, while outsta nding as compared with
most count ries,
has lagged behind the rapid increa ses in indus trial produ ctivity
.
The domina nt growth of output and of produ ctivity has occurr ed in
indus
trial activi ty--m anufa cturin g, constr uction , electr ic and other
forms of power ,
and transp ortati on. With this has gone substa ntial change s in the
compo sition
of manuf acturin g outpu t, in respon se to domes tic and export demand
and to
Japan 's abilit y to produc e. These change s might be summed up in
terms of di
versif icatio n, sophi sticat ion, and effici ency.
Prewa r, much of Japan 's manuf acturin g was in cotton and silk textil
es,
though machin ery and armaments were of increa sing import ance in
the 1930's .
By the 1960 1 s Japan had develo ped an extrem ely divers ified manuf
acturin g sector
capabl e of produc ing almost every produ ct existi ng in the world
(thoug h not
all effici ently ). These ranged from the world 's larges t ocean tanke
rs, to
camer as, compu ters and color televi sion, as well as tradit ional
textil es and
sundri es (souve nir gee-ga ws). Partic ularly rapid growth sector s
have includ ed
iron and steel, chemi cals, petro- chemi cals, machi nery, and consum
er durabl es
such as televi sion, transi storiz ed this and that, washing machi
nes, refrig era
tors and, more recen tly, autom obiles . With divers ificat ion has
come increa sing
sophi sticat ion of produ ct, as is obviou s from the random sample
of items pro
duced.
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Japan is not simply a diversified producer of manufactured goods, but on
the whole a highly efficient producer.
of products while reducing costs.

It has been able to enhance the quality

Its technological level is now highly advanced

in many sectors; in pig iron, shipbuilding, radio receivers and a few other areas
its technology is pre-eminent.

In most highly sophisticated items, however,

Japan still remains somewhat behind the most advanced technology of the United
States or Europe.

Most Japanese industries are making rapid technological

strides, while combining labor and capital efficiently, so that their competi
tive power at home and abroad continues to grow.
Japanese growth? while rapid, certainly has not been smooth.
war economy has moved ahead in great spurts.

The post

Booms have developed which gener

ate real growth rates---12, 13, 15 percent--that simply cannot be sustained.
Bottlenecks develop, actual and potential export production is diverted to do
mestic uses, imports of required industrial materials and other goods increase
rapidly.

The result has inevitably been periodic balance of payments crises.

The solution has been to temporarily slow down what the Japanese term the :;over
heated economy 11 by means of restrictive monetary (and sometimes fiscal} mea
sures.

As soon as the balance of payments difficulties are resolved, the re

straints are removed and the resumption of rapid growth encouraged, and achieved,
once again.
This cycle has a course of three to four years.

While the amplitude of

fluctuation is great, this is primarily because in boom periods the growth rate
substantially exceeds the average, rather than because the recession phases are
severe.. Indeed, not only are the recessions brief--about 12 months--they are
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very mild:
put.

there is only a slowdown in growth , not an absolu te decline in out

The slowest growth rate in any postwa r year was 2.8 percen t (in 1954);

the simple average of growth rates for recessi on years 1954, 1958, 1962,
and
1965 is 3.9 percen t--bett er than the average growth rate of the United States
for the entire period .
So far it has been imposs ible to arrive at

a· compre hensive

explan ation

of the causes of Japan' s postwa r growth perform ance which adequa tely determ
ines
the relativ e importa nce of the major causal factors .
of causes have clearly been of great importa nce:

Three interre lated sets

a large supply of highly

motiva ted~ relativ ely skilled or at least trainab le labor for indust rial
uses;
a very rapid rate of techno logical innova tion and transfo rmatio n; and an
im
pressiv ely high rate of capita l formati on and saving.
Even prior to World War II Japane se indust rializa tion had not proceed ed
far enough in its absorp tion of labor to reduce substa ntially the absolu
te num
ber of workers in agricu lture from early Meiji levels .

Wartime bombing and

postwa r repatri ation further swelled the numbers in agricu lture.

This consti 

tuted an immense stock of labor in relativ ely low produc tivity uses; to this
should be added labor in other areas of low produc tivity, such as small-s
cale
manufa cturing , fishing , retaili ng and other service s.

Popula tion growth was

rapid in the early postwa r period , but the legaliz ation of abortio n (for
rea
sons of economic as well as physic al or psycho logical health) sharply reduced
the birth rate from the early 1950's .

The lagged effect on new entran ts on

the labor force was only beginn ing to be felt in the mid 1960 1 s.
been a country of relativ ely ample labor supply.

Japan has

-26Japan 's labor force is highl y motiv ated- -indu striou s and
hardw orking .
It also is well educa ted.

Nine years educa tion is mand atory; most child ren go

on to senio r high, and a highe r propo rtion of the age group
contin ue to colle ge
than in any other count ry aside from the Unite d State s.
An impor tant Occup a
tion reform was to incre ase the number of colle ges and unive
rsitie s, and gener 
ally to stres s incre ased educa tiona l oppo rtunit ies. Educa
tional attain ment is
the most impor tant means for achie ving upward socia l and
economic mobi lity in
Japan . Most Japan ese paren ts are highl y educa tion-c onsci
ous, encou raging their
child ren to become bette r educa ted than their paren ts, and
savin g assid uousl y
to meet the risin g costs of highe r educa tion. All this has
resul ted in a labor
force which is bette r train ed in gener al and in speci fic
vocat ional skill s and,
perha ps equal ly impo rtant, recep tive to furth er learn ing
on the job. This
improvement in the quali ty of labor has been subst antia l,
but proba bly not
striki ngly more so than in other indus trial coun tries. The
suppl y of labor ,
and its improvements in quali ty, have been suppo rtive, indee
d essen tial fac
tors for rapid growt h, but not the initia ting cause . Rough
ly estim ated, ap
proxi matel y one-q uarte r of Japan 's growt h of outpu t can be
attrib uted to the
comb inatio n of incre ase in labor force and its reallo catio
n from lower to
highe r produ ctivit y uses.
The trans fer of labor from agric ultur e and other low produ
ctivit y uses
has been accom plishe d prima rily by the movement of young
peopl e when they first
enter the labor force as schoo l gradu ates. Only one-t enth
of farm child ren are
remai ning in agric ultur e, the other s migra ting to facto ry
and relate d jobs in
nearb y towns and large r citie s. By the mid 196O 's large
firms , which typic ally
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hire only new entrants into the labor force and retain them for their entire work
life, were complaining of shortages of labor, but this was really only in terms
of new entrants • There has also been movement among the economically active into
higher productivity, higher paying jobs.

Thus, more than one-half of farm family

income is derived from non-farm activities; the father works in a nearby factory
and much of the farming work is done by his parents and his wife.
One of the most impressive facets of the Japanese performance has been
the improvement in productivity due to technological innovation.

Japanese

business has been highly innovation-oriented in physical production processes,
primarily in adopting and adapting techniques that had quick commercial appli
cation.

So far there has been much less emphasis on basic research.

This has

been especially true of foreign technology which has been inducted into Japan
on a larger and more diverse scale than has ever occurred anywhere.
Several points stand out about this immense foreign technological in
flow.

First, Japan's increasing isolation from the West after 1937 meant that

by 1955, when the technological inflow began to assume substantial proportions,
the gap between Japan's level of technology and the best available in the West
had widened substantially.

Moreover, prewar Japan had not yet reached the

frontiers of advanced technology in most fields, less so than today.
Second, probably as important as the technological gap itself has been
Japan's enhanced capacity to absorb foreign technology on a large scale.

By

the l950's it had the managers, the engineers, the skilled technicians--in
sufficient quantity and variety--that foreign technology was not overly diffi
cult to learn about , to learn, and to adapt as well as adopt.

This widespread
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ability has been the cumula tion of the long proces s of develop ment.

It probab ly

was enhance d by the produc tion require ments of war, and again by certain
of the
postwa r reform s.
Third, foreign technol ogy has been obtaine d almost entirel y by licensi ng
arrange ments, patent purcha se, and technic al. tie-ups of Japane se private
firms
with their counte rparts abroad .

Very little has come in by the route of foreign

busine ss direct investm ent in Japan; where that has occurre d it usually has
been
in the form of a joint venture between Japane se and foreign firms with manage

ment often in Japanes e hands.

Until the late 1950's few foreign firms regarde d

the Japane se market as particu larly good relativ e to the difficu lties of
doing
busine ss.

The Japanes e government has had a consis tent policy of opposi tion to

foreign direct investm ent for a variety of reason s:

fear of foreign contro l of

strateg ic sectors ; concern that Japane se firms in specifi c indust ries would
be
outcom peted; concern that foreign firms will not fit into, and indeed possib
ly
disrup t, the inform al but close relatio ns and contro ls of government with
busi
ness; an evalua tion that royalty and license paymen ts, while expens ive, would
be
less than profits which would be made by foreign firms; and plain xenoph
obia.
The policy has gradua lly become less restric tive.

The United States and other

countr ies have put pressu re on Japan to "act like other advance d nation s."

In ad•

dition ,as Japan approac hes the techno logical frontie r of knowledge in specif
ic
areas, it has only one foreign company with whom to bargain , rather than
the
severa l or more firms which contro l the slightl y less advance d techno logy.

This

foreign firm frequen tly utilize s its superio r bargain ing positio n by requiri
ng
a share of profits --usua lly through a joint ventur e--rath er than settlin g
solely
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for a licensing arrangement.
Technological innovation has by no means been limited to adoption of
foreign technology.

Much has been the improvement and commercial application

of Japan's own research and development efforts.
ample.

Shipbuilding is just one ex

Japanese shipbuilding firms have become pre-eminent in the world, es

pecially for immense petroleum and other bulk carriers.

Optics--in cameras,

biD&culars, and electron microscopes--i s another field relying heavily on
domestically-de veloped technology.

Adaptation of a given technology to obtain

superior performance has been an important factor in enhancing productivity.
Typically large firms surround a new machine or process with many engineers not
simply to learn but to make numerous small adjust~ents and improvements.
is expensive--engi neers aren't all that cheap--but it pays off.

This

One Japanese

steelmaker was able to produce 3,500 tons from a unit of 2,500 ton rated ca
pacity.

Other examples abound.

No overall evaluation exists, but this approach

ha.s probably led to increases in productivity from 10 to 20 percent above rated
capacity.
Two final points should be made about the high rate of technological
innovation.

First, innovation has been concentrated mainly on the physical pro

duction process.

Japanese firms have done much less to reduce overhead costs-

to improve administrati.on, finance, sales, etc.

It may well be that production

processes, because of their very characteristic of being 11 physical 11 and "tech
nical, 11 somehow made necessary any sorts of adjustments in human responses and
interpersonal relationships.

This is much less true of administrative activi

ties, where changes may seem to impede much more upon certain established
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patterns of human relationshi ps and behavior, while the changes in themselves
may seem less essential.

Why minimize the amount of cash balances, when a firm

thinks in the context of its total relationshi p to its lending bank?

Won't an

otherwise desirable change in distributio n strategy undermine and perhaps even
bankrupt the entire inefficient network of wholesalers , sub-wholes alers, and
retailers which has been connected to the firm for so long?

It is not surpris

ing that innovation has come about less rapidly in management than in production.
Second, innovation has not just meant that a few large firms utilize the
latest techniques but that modern technology has been dispersed throughout the
economy.

About 40 percent of Japan's total labor force now works with high

productivit y in modern plants using recent equipment and technology.

It is this

widespread improvement in production methods which has resulted in the rapid
growth rate of aggregate productivit y and output in the economy as a whole.
Both labor force and technologic al innovation have been closely inter-
related with the third major cause of Japan's rapid growth--the high rate of
investment.

The increasing production of labor in all uses, the growth of the

labor force, and the shift of labor to relatively higher productivit y uses have
all required additional amounts of invested capital.

Not all, but many, tech

nological improvements have been embodied in the new machines and other equip
ment, domesticall y produced or imported, which constitute an important share of
investment.

Only with a rapid rate of new investment could innovation have been

so large and pervasive and output per worker increased so much.
A high proportion of investment has been in business plants and equipment
and in government fixed investment in transportat ion and other forms of social

overh ead neces sary for grow th.

Table 1 indic ates in the final column just how

rapid the incre ase in inves tmen t has been .

The inev itabl e conse quenc e has been

a risin g prop ortio n of the econo my's outpu t being ploug
hed back into facil ities
for furth er grow th, as shown in the other columns in
Table 1. The share of gross
dome stic inves tmen t (priv ate plus publ ic) in GNP went
from 25-30 perce nt in the
mid 1950 's to 35-40 perce nt in the 1960 1 s. This is
the high est rate ever achie ved
for any lengt h of time in peace in a priva te mark et-or
iente d economy, i.e., on
a volun tary, non-c oerci ve basis . Simi larly fixed inves
tmen t in faci litie s, ex
cludi ng hous ing, rose from about 18 perce nt of GNP
to 27-30 perce nt. The most
rapid grow th occu rred in the inves tmen t boom of 19591961. Ther eafte r the rate
of grow th of inves tmen t has level led off somewhat,
but at a sign ifica ntly highe r
prop ortio n of GNP.
The over all strat egy of grow th has been to ploug h
inve stibl e funds into
the expan sion of priva te produ ction facil ities in ord.er
to incre ase outpu t as
rapid ly as poss ible. This strat egy provi ded the ha.sis
of polic y under the Occu
patio n and has conti nued since . At the begin ning gover
nmen t initi ative was
impo rtant in the recon struc tion of basic indu strie s.
Ther eafte r inves tmen t has
been incre asing ly by priva te busin ess on its own initi
ative . Thus it is mis
leadi ng to use the term "stra tegyn as if it impl ies
a highl y centr alize d de
cisio n-ma king autho rity with full contr ol over the
alloc ation of resou rces.
Altho ugh the relat ionsh ip betwe en government and busin
ess is close , with con
sider ably more gover nmen t influ ence than in the Unite
d State s on priva te busin ess
decis ions regar ding prod uctio n, prici ng, new inves tmen
t in expan sion of capa city,
etc., none thele ss the gover nmen t has not been able
to pred ict well , or judge in
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Table 1
Gross Nationa l Product and its Uses
(based on 1960 constan t prices)

Gross Nationa l Product
( $ billion) a

1952

1957

1962

1967

Average
Annual
Rate of
Growth

21.4

32.2

52.7

84.7

9.6

59.8
31.0

57.8
27.9
7.7

51.1

8.5

7.0

54.3
21.8
7.5
8.7

17,5
11.7
3.1
2.7

26.2
16.2
3,5
6.5

27.5
21.2
4.o
2.3

19.6
13.2
6.4
6.o
0.1
0.3

16.1
9.6
6.5
6.2
-0.2
o.4

17.8
8.1
9.7
9.2
0.1
o.4

15.7
6.9

8.1

3.1
10.2
7.0

o.o
11.1
11.1

o.4
11.9
11.5

o.4
14.8
14.4

-4.4
12.4

Used for (in percent of GNP)
Private Consumption
Food, Beverag es and Tobacco
Clothing
Housing Services

J

Gross Private Investm ent
Plant and Equipment
Housing
Invento ries
Government Purchase s
Consumption
Investm ent
Fixed
Invento ries
Housing
Net Sales Abroadb
Exports
Imports
a:
b:

7-5
7.3

5.0

14.9

Converte d at the officia l exchange rate parity o:r 360 yen= $1.
Exports minus imports of goods, service s, and factor payment s.

Source:

Government of Japan, Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Nationa l
Income Statisti cs. 1968.
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detail, much less control, the amount of private investment that will be under
taken.

Policymakers have been surprised to see a higher-than-anticipated surge

of private investment in productive capacity following each recession.

Although

with favorable impact on growth, the rapid increases in investment have caused
the unsustainable booms already discussed.

Government policy has not succeeded

in holding back private investment by direct controls or administrative guid
ance (informal pressure, consultations, backed with veiled threats of more
serious action).

Instead the government has waited until the last moment and

then applied general restraints through fiscal and monetary policy.

In large

part this slowness to act has been one of lack of will rather than lack of
means:

the government in power always has had a pro-growth bias, and doesn't

want to {seem to) choke off the boom prematurely.
All this suggests an economy in which private enterprise has been terri
bly eager to invest in order to expand productive capacity and output, much more
so than in other countries.

This is essentially correct.

It does not have to

be explained by reference to some exotic form of business behavior peculiar to
Japan.

This investment has paid off--in higher profits and larger-sized firms.

Businessmen have had very optimistic expectations which have on the whole been
fulfilled.

In a sense it has been self-fulfilling; as many firms in all in

dustries have tried to grow rapidly they have generated the demands for each
others' and thereby their own products.

Technological innovation, which has

been so highly oriented to quick commercial application, has indeed paid off
in profits.

Profit rates on new investment rose substantially in the late

1950's and early 1960 1 s; they apparently have receded somewhat since, but new
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A further importa nt motiva tion for large busine ss enterp rise has been its
ranking relativ e to other firms measur ed in terms of output or sales.

Becaus e

stock owners hip has become so widely distrib uted, most large busine ss enter
prises are in fact contro lled by management.

They cannot be comple tely imper

vious to the stockh olders, but so long as profits appear adequa te managem
ent
has great indepen dence of action.

Management appare ntly does not conceiv e of

its role solely to maximize profits but also to enhanc e, or at least mainta
in,
its status in the industr y, commonly measure d by its relativ e sales ranking
.
Thus aggress ive firms, not quite at the top of the heap,at tempt to increas
e
market share.

This shows up particu larly in booms, when some firms race ahead

in expand ing capaci ty regard less of pressu res fr9m the governm ent and other
firms fo the industr y.

This compet itive spirit is an importa nt reason for the

high rate of busine ss investm ent.
The high rates of investm ent flows have natura lly resulte d in a tremend ous
increas e in Japan's capita l stock.

The private sector fixed capita l stock more

than tripled between 1950-1964, while that of the government doubled .

Of the

increas e in private fixed capita l, 45 percen t was in manufa cturing , followe
d
by 14 percen t in agricu lture, 11 percen t in electr icity, gas and water,
9 per
cent in commerce, and 7 percen t in transp ortatio n and commu nication s.

With the

much slower rate of growth of popula tion, the a.mount of capita l per worker
in
the economy has more than doubled .
Investm ent has to be finance d out of saving , either that done within the
economy or by borrow ing the savings of foreign ers.

In Japan the extrao rdinari ly

-35-

high rate of investment has been matched by an extraordina rily high rate of domestic!

'

saving.

Corporate business retains a high proportion of its profits to invest

in expansion.

The government saves large amounts (defined as tax and other

revenues minus current expenditure s for government services) to invest in fa••
cilities for transportat ion, communicati ons, education, and public services.
One-third of gross saving consists of depreciatio n funds, generated by the rapid
investment itself and by favorable depreciatio n rates.
Most impressive of all is that one-third of gross saving is done by private
individuals- -wage and salary earners, divident and rent recipients, farmers, and
owners of unincorpora ted non-farm enterprises .

Even though income levels are

below those in the West, all groups save a higher proportion of income than in
other advanced countries.

For example, during the 1960's, urban wage earners

have been saving about 15-20 percent of their disposable income--mor e than
twice the savings rate of workers in the United States.

Farmers have a some-

what lower but still significant rate--about 10 percent.

Owners of unincor

porated enterprises have even higher savings rates--on the order of 25--35 per
cent, 'though the data are poor.
The relative importance of various factors causing these hi.gh savings
rates have not been well sorted out yet.

Probably the inadequate retirement

programs of government and business are an important influence', people save
for their old age.

With credit expensive and not readily available, there is

considerabl e target saving for housing, purchase of consumer durables, and
children's education.

Small business owners have similar difficultie s in bor

rowing, and have even greater incentive to plough back earnings than in large
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firms.

The wage system of large and increasing semi-annual bonuses probably

has had an important impact on wage-earner s saving.

Lurking in the background

of the explanation s is the vaguely-art iculated feeling that the Japanese are
frugal; in one sense a tautology (frugality meaning a high saving rate) it also
implies something about Japanese preferences for future versus present consump
tion, the desire to protect against possible

future adversities , the desire to

pass on wealth to children, etc.
In Japan even more than in most other advanced economies different indi-
viduals and groups have been doing the saving and the investing.

Despite its

very high savings rate out of profits, corporate business investment has grown
even more rapidly.

This had to be financed from external funds--stoc k and bond

issue and borrowings, mainly from financial institution s.

Large firms are

heavily in debt; net worth is only 20 percent of total liabilities .

Stock issue

has constituted only about 5 percent of industrial funds, and bonds even less.
From management 's viewpoint stock issue is expensive because new shares are is
sued at par (usually considerabl y less than the market price) and dividends,
unlike interest, come from profits after taxes.

Bond issue is limited because,

with interest rates on bonds pegged by government pressure below those on long
term loans or other competing interest rates, there are few buyers.

Commercial

banks and other financial institution s have filled the gap by extensive lending,
both long-term and short-term.

In turn, individuals tend to hold their savings

in time deposits and other financial forms.

The financial system thus has been

an efficient and effective intermediar y between savers and investors, its allo
cation of credit has enabled the growth of business investment to occur.

-3.7-

There have been a wide variet y of other, perhap s lesser , causes
of post
war Japan 's outsta nding ly succes sful economic perfor mance . The
govern ment, as
alread y indica ted, has placed domes tic economic growth at the top
of its policy
object ives. It has relied on privat e enterp rise to produc e the
goods. The
govern ment's main role has been:

to refrai n, where ever possib le, from compe t

ing with busine ss for resou rces-- i.e., allowi ng busine ss first
claim on inves
tible funds for expan sion; to aid and encour age busine ss with specia
l tax con
cessio ns, loans to "impo rtant'' indus tries, provis ion of the social
overhe ad
facili ties essen tial to maint ain privat e produ ction; and to produc
e optimi s·
ticall y realis tic five-y ear plans (reall y projec tions) which busine
ss has taken
suffic iently seriou sly to regard as minimum target s (which indeed
they have
turned out to be).

Becaus e of the no-war clause (Artic le 9) in the Const itu

tion and the securi ty umbre lla provid ed under the arrang ement s
with the United
States , government expen diture s on defens e have been neglig ible,
less than 1
percen t of GNP in contra st to the 6 percen t in prewar 1934--36.
Resou rces have
thus been freed for more produ ctive uses, and have so been used.
Of major import ance has been Japan 's abilit y to obtain and pay
for the
import s essen tial for this growth proces s.

Japan 's dense popul ation in a rela

tively small land space, of which only about 15 percen t is arable
, means that
high and increa sing levels of GNP per capita can be achiev ed only
by main re
liance on indus trial produ ction. Yet Japan lacks suffic ient suppli
es of the
basic miner al and plant mater ials used in indus trial produ ction.
It has to
import all, or virtua lly, of its petrol eum, iron ore, bauxi te,
miner al phos
phate, cotton , wool, natura l rubbe r, soybea ns, 60-80 percen t of
its coking
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coal, hides, salt, sugar and wheat, and more than 20 percent (on a caloric
basis) of all its foodstuffs.

Japan, like all nations, imports substantial

amounts of sophisticated machinery in which other countries have a comparative
advantage; examples include Boeing 707s, certain kinds of ship engines, and
specialty steel manufacturing equipment.

Virtually all of Japan's imports can

be regarded as necessities; the importation of consumer manufactured goods is
a negligible proportion of the total.
Access to, and the ability to pay for, imports has thus been an extremely
important objective, nto just in terms of domestic economic policy, but as the
cornerstone of foreign policy.

Japan has achieved this objective remarkably

well, due both to its own efforts and to favorable changes in the world trading
environment.

World trade has grown more rapidly than ever before in world his

tory, as world GNP has increased and as trade restrictions have been successive
ly reduced.

Japan benefitted also from the decline in world prices of raw ma

terials during the 1950's, a decline which saw the price index of Japanese
imports drop by 20 percent, more than offsetting the 10 percent drop in Japan's
export prices.
While importing at a rate considerably more rapid than the world as a
whole, Japan has succeeded in expanding exports equally rapidly (see Table 1),
at more than double the world rate.

This was essential for Japan to be able

to pay for its import requirements.
Japan's superior export performance is attributable to a number of fac
tors.

Japan is a highly export--conscious nation.

The government bureaucracy,

businessmen, and even the general public--indoctrinated with such national
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slogans as nprosperity through exports and stability through saving 1;---are so
aware of the importance of exports that they have become virtually an end in
themselves rather than a means of paying for imports.

Considerable effort goes

into analysis, projections, and achievement of export performance.

Exports re

ceive special consideration in the financing of their productive capacity, pro
duction itself, and sales, in inspections and other controls over quality, in
legalized formation of production and distribution cartels, and in various
other, more subtle ways.

Basically, exports have done so well because of in

creased supply capacity resulting from the industrial investment boom; the com
petitive production of entirely new products; enhanced price competitiveness
relative to other advanced countries from reducing labor costs per unit of
output (wage increases have been rapid but productivity gains even more rapid);
and changes in the composition of Japanese exports from commodities for which
world demand in trade was growing slowly to those with rapid growth.

Typical

is the relative shift to transistor radios, color television, cameras, and
automobiles and away from cotton and silk textiles, the prewar mainstays.

In

other cases world demand may be growing less rapidly but Japan has sharply in-
creased its market share by cost-cutting and capacity-expand ing investment with
technical change; ships, and iron and steel, are the most important examples.
In the final analysis much of Japan's economic success must be attributed
to the human factor.

Japanese are a highly achieving, energetic, pragmatic

restless people always on the look-out for new opportunities.

The basic at

titude toward many economic problems is that they can be solved through growth.
The size of the slice of the pie becomes less important when the pie is rapidly
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becoming larger.

Japanese are willing to work hard, to learn new methods, to

save for the future, and to undertake the entrepreneurial risks inherent in any
new production and investment.

III.

The Political Economy and Welfare of Gro,nh
Super-fast economic growth since the end of the Occupation and reconstruc

tion has wrought great changes in Japan, changes that continue rapidly and the
implications of which are only beginning to be understood.

In this section, I

briefly consider living standards, the evolution of Occupation reforms, the
emergence of a new

11

establishment, 11 and the political system and the government

business relationship.
Rapid economic growth has brought a major improvement in family incomes
and standards of living.

The benefits of growth have been widely distributed;

virtually everyone is substantially better off.

This has been accomplished

mainly by higher wages and better employment opportunities rather than by social
expenditures, which have remained a small proportion of governmental budgets.
Thus those who have benefitted least from growth are the ag~d, the widowed, the
older unskilled day laborer, and other deprived groups who are unable to pro
vide for themselves fully.

Discrimination has probably reduced the benefits

occurring to Korean residents in Japan and to the outcaste group of Japanese
(burakumin, or eta).

Nonetheless, the improvements have been sufficiently wide

spread that there are no major groups which feel they have been completely left
out of Japan's economic progress.
For the economy as a whole, adjusted for price rises and taxes, disposable
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1952 and 196 6, at a 7.6 perc ent aver 
age annu al rate . It is very diff icu lt
to make dire ct com pari sons with disp osab
le
income leve ls in othe r cou ntri es, sinc e
Japa nese typ ical ly consume somewhat
diff eren t com mod ities and in diff eren t
prop orti ons and sinc e the rela tive pric
es
betw een commodities (say fish and refr iger
ator s) vary acco rdin g to cou ntry . The
offi cial exch ange rate , which is deri ved
from the rela tion ship betw een goods im
port ed and exp orte d (a rela tive ly sma ll
prop orti on of tota l goods and serv ices
in mos t econ omi es), clea rly und erst ates
the real purc hasi ng power of money in
alm ost all cou ntri es. For exam ple, Japa
n's disp osab le income per cap ita in 1967
mea sure d at the offi cial exch ange rate
is $770, Measured in purc hasi ng power
in term s of Uni ted Stat es rela tive pric
es in 1965 dol lars , the per cap ita dis
posa ble income was appr oxim atel y $1200.
This was abou t four -nin ths the U.S.
leve l, and somewhat less than maj or Euro
pean cou ntri es asid e from Ital y.
Pers ona l cons ump tion has rise n rapi dly,
at a 7,5 perc ent aver age annu al
rate per cap ita betw een 1952 and 1967 .
As Tab le l indi cate s, the shar e of food
and clot hing in tota l cons ump tion has decl
ined ; with high er incomes peo ple have
been able to devo te more to recr eati on,
consumer dura bles , and othe r disc re
tion ary uses . Most hous ehol d dura bles
are more wid ely diff used than in Euro pe.
For example 96 perc ent of Japa n~se homes
have tele visi on, 78 perc ent refr iger 
ator s, 85 perc ent elec tric wash ing mac hine
s, and 54 perc ent vacuum clea ners ,
thou gh only 13 perc ent have an auto mob
ile, and 4 perc ent room air con diti one rs.
The cons ump tion patt ern has been somewhat
lops ided in that hou sing and
1This
is abou t one -thi rd less than GNP per cap
ita and one -six th less
than nati ona l income per cap ita. The main
diff
eren
ces
are corp orat e reta ined
inco me, government reve nues less tran sfer
s
to
indi
vidu
als,
and (for GNP) de
prec iati on allo wan ces. Disp osab le income
can eith er be spen t for consump
tion or save d.
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s, bette r roads ,
preve ntion of air and water pollu tion, and solut ion to proble
ms of urban con
gestio n, have lagge d. Thus in some ways urban livin g has
worse ned rathe r than
improved (for the middl e class ). This resul ted inevi tably
from the prior ity
government and the finan cial system gave to busin ess inves
tment and, withi n
government expen diture s, to inves tment in trans porta tion
and other facil ities
which direc tly suppo rted priva te produ ction. Metro polita
n area housi ng is ex
pensi ve, espec ially becau se land costs are high, yet mortg
age credi t is avail 
able for only a small propo rtion of the total cost. Hence
gaps betwe en the
suppl ies of priva te consu mptio n goods and of publi c goods
relat ive to their re
spect ive demands appea red by the late 1950' s and have widen
ed since then. While
a reallo catio n of inves tment reallo catio n of inves tment relat
ively towar d
housi ng and provi sion of publi c servi ces would proba bly slow
down the measu red
growth rate, it would proba bly also do more to enhan ce the
gener al welfa re.
Indee d it is not readi ly appar ent why these lags have been
toler ated. Perha ps
the postw ar recon struc tion syndrome, with its justi ficat ion
of perso nal sacri 
fices for the sake of growt h of outpu t, has contin ued to
be impor tant. The
demand for publi c servi ces is not alway s well articu lated
in a demo cratic poli
tical system . As a conse quenc e of organ ized inter est group
press ures, even more
than in other demo cracie s government polic y has focus sed
on produ cers rathe r
than consu mers. Perha ps foreig n obser vers overe stima te the
exten t of demand for
publi c goods ; indiv idual s in what has been a relat ively low
income count ry by
Western stand ards may simpl y prefe r priva te consu mptio n.
And no doubt the very
natur e of rapid growt h produ ces such imbal ances ~ since it
is not possi ble to

synchronize completely all secotrs of the economy.
While all family incomes have risen substantially, the equality of income
distribution has been reduced slightly from early postwar.

This has been a

result more of growth-oriented policies and of changes emanating from growth it
self than any attempt to undermine the Occupation reform objectives.

Certainly

income distribution appears to be at least as equal as in the United States.
variety of forces have tended to reduce equality.

A

The government provided in

ducements to save, in order to raise the saving rate, by giving favorable tax
treatment to dividends and interest; this favored the relatively more wealthy.
It has tolerated systematic understatement of income and profits of small busi
ness.

In its de facto strategy of allowing private business first claim on re

sources, it has held down its social welfare expenditures (which typically benefit
the poorest in a society); this is in sharp contrast to postwar Europe and the
United States.
In the early l950's older workers, those with longer service, those with
more education, and those working in larger firms received much higher wages
than young, low seniority, less educated workers in smaller firms.
all these differentials have substantially narrowed.
tive position of lower income workers.

Since then

This has raised the rela

While some of the general rise in wage

rates (78 percent in real terms between 1953 and 1967) may have been attribu
table to labor union activity, though this is not at all clear, primarily the
general increase and the narrowing differential has been due to the rapidly
growing business demand for labor combined with the practice of large firms of
hiring only young people.
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Despite the draining off of labor from agriculture , with concomitant sub
stitution of small tractors and other capital equipment, labor productivit y in
agriculture has almost inevitably grown less rapidly than in manufacturi ng.
would imply a worsening of the relative income position of farmers.
have occurred to prevent that.

Two things

First, the government has allowed the prices of

agricultura l products to rise relative to manufacture d good.
two ways.

This

This was done in

The government, which purchases most of the rice crop every year for

resale to consumers, has responded to farmer political pressure by raising its
purchase price every year; the purchase price in 1967 was 94 percent above that
a decade earlier, and was more than double the world trade price.

This suggests

the second mechanism for the increase in prices of agricultura l products:

to

protect domestic agriculture and to transfer income to farmers from consumers
the government has severely restricted the competitive import of foodstuffs.
As demand for agricultura l products--e specially fruits, vegetables, dairy prod
ucts and meat--has gone up with higher incomes and standards of living, supply
has increased in response, but less rapidly, so that prices have risen.
The second way in which farmer wealth, if not directly income, has been
greatly affected has been by the rapid increase in land values, particularl y
near urban areas.

Postwar growth has accelerated the rate of urbanizatio n; now

more than two-thirds of the population live in cities.

Metropolita n housing

has expanded out into agricultura l field; so too have factories.

In the process,

the price of urban land increased 925 percent between 1955 and 1967, in con
trast to a 10 percent rise in the wholesale price index and 60 percent rise in
consumer price index.

Both urban landowners and farmers near cities have become
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wealthy.

Farm land values have risen also because of increased agricultural out

put (and its price) per unit of land.

Only farmers in the hinterlands--far from

markets and farming hilly, marginal land--have had their land value decline, as
young potential farmers move instead into urban jobs.

One of the unintended

side effects of the Occupation land reform was to make ex-tenants increasingly
wealthy as land values have risen.

Former landlords have fumed, and organized

to demand additional government compensation,but the extra amounts they have
received have not been large.
Growth has not been without its problems.

I have already mentioned the

lagging growth of housing and public services, particularly in urban areas.
These have been an important component of the stresses and strains of the urbani
zation.

Another problem has been the persistent rise since 1959 in consumer

prices of about 5 percent annually.

Even though money wages and incomes have

increased more rapidly, housewives have vociferously protested.

The five-year

economic plans in the 1960 1 s stipulated a maximum increase in consumer prices
of about 2-3 percent per year, but as the economy has grown more rapidly than
projected in the plans so too have prices.
The rise in consumer prices has been mainly in services, agricultural
commodities, and goods produced by small manufacturers, where wages have risen
more than productivity.

Prices of goods produced by large firms, where pro

ductivity increases are greatest, have risen only slightly, or in some cases
actually fallen.

Accordingly wholesale prices, and of particular significance

export prices, have not tended to go up much.
situation.

Prices of services epitomize the

For example, it is difficult to increase substantially a barber's
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produ ctivity :

the only ways he can increa se his income are to raise prices and

to reduce qualit y (no free hairwa sh and shave) .

In the proces s of economic de

goods and ser
velopm ent it is natura l to have change s in the relati ve prices of
g economy
vices as demand and produ ctivity change s occur. In a buoya nt, growin
er price in
with high aggreg ate demand it is not surpri sing to find the consum
dex rising .
harm
On the whole the increa se in consumer prices has not been all that
ful.

Real incomes have risen.

The consumer price rise is due prima rily to the

lled, low income
absolu tely and relati vely increa sing wage rates for young, unski
at least among
labor. This has tended somewhat to equali ze income distri butio n,
preven t con
the lower 60 percen t of the popul ation. Deflat ionary polici es to
ic growth
sumer price rises would not only have slowed the real rate of econom
wages would
but would have partic ularly hit the low income wage earne rs, whose
have increa sed much less rapidl y.
ered-
While both agricu lture and small busine ss in gener al have prosp
of all has
though not withou t their own diffic ulties --wha t has prospe red most
ment and
been big busin ess, financ e and commerce. Their rate of new invest
has been
techno logica l innova tion has been more rapid, their share in output
a big busine ss
rising , and their power in societ y increa sing. Japan is as much
societ y today as it has ever been.
the
Big busine ss has close and extrem ely complex relatio nship s with
(LDP),
centra l government bureau racy and with the Libera l-Dem ocratic Party
involv ed
the conse rvativ e politi cal party in power. Government is much more
marke t
in busine ss decisio n-mak ing than in most other privat e enterp rise,
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economies.

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials keep

in virtually daily contact with large firms.

MITI tries to assist large firms

in a variety of ways; in exchange it applies informal pressures (termed "adminis
trative guidance 11 ) to reduce

11

excessiveiV or 11 wasteful 11 competition among firms,

to synchronize new capacity expansion programs among firms and industries in
line with stable growth and other objectives, to arrange cartels to prevent
;;excessive 11 price declines in recessions, etc.

Ministry of Finance (MoF) and

Bank of Japan (BoJ) officials are in daily contact with the major commercial
banks.

Politicians serve, as one of their functions, as brokers between busi

ness and the government bureaucracy.

There has been a high degree of consensus

at the general level among businessmen, government bureaucrats, and the LDP
politicians.

The slogan

11

what is good for the country is good for Mitsubishi,

and vice-versa" is quite, if not completely, operative.
At times, of course, conflicts do arise:

the government bureaucrats want

businessmen to toe the line more than they are willing, or certain industries
want favors which bureaucrats feel are not in the national interest.

The pro

cess by which conflicts are resolved is not well understood, nor is it clear
whether government dominates business or business dominates government,

The

LDP and its party leaders rely heavily on financing from big business; they
control the government bureaucracy but also need its expertise for advice and
implementation.

The bureaucracy has strong legal and extra-legal ( 11 guidance")

powers over business.

However, bureaucrats retire early (typically at age 55);

many move into high, plush positions in large firms with which they formally
dealt.

The three-way interplay is subtle and not well known; which comes out
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The interrel ationsh ips among big busines ses, and among busines s, govern
ment bureauc racy and LDP politici ans are rather close, persona l and informa l.
In the Japanese meritocr acy--wh ere social mobility is achieved in large part
through educatio n, and where the more prestigi ous the univers ity (and diffi
cult to pass the entrance examina tion) the greater the chance of being hired
by big business or government ministry , and eventua lly succeed ing in politics -
most of the senior government and business officia ls, and many politici ans,
are bound by school ties that are close and importa nt.

Graduat es of the same

univers ity have a special call on each other; this call is intensif ied where
they were classma tes, or studied under the same professo r.

These ties are re

inforced by interma rriage among families .
All this has led observe rs to speak of a Japanese

11

Establis hment"- -500,

or 2,000 or some other number of importan t individu als who, on the basis of
their busines s, governm ent and/or politica l affiliat ion, and common educatio n
and acquain tanceshi p, make the importan t decision s for Japan.

There is some

thing to this apprais al, but it is difficu lt to know how much.

In fact the

grouping s are somewhat diffuse and plurali stic; this shows up particu larly in
the case of specific issues.

There does not seem to be such a fully cohesiv e,

unified , elite Establis hment that can and does determin e all major decision s.
What has prevente d such an overwhe lming, monolit hic establis hment from
emerging?

Three interrel ated factors are importa nt.

First, the specific

interest s of various groups differ, and at times are in conflic t, when con
crete issues arise.

I have noted already that this occurs among the three
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big business, LDP politicians , and central government bureaucrats .

It also occurs within each group.

Second, pressures which help influence and

shape policy decisions emanate from outside--th e opposition political parties,
unions, small business, farmers, the intellectua ls.

Third, while Japan is a

group-orien ted society with emphasis on harmony, consensus, and cooperation ,
at the same time the Japanese people are highly competitive .
Business, government bureaucracy , and society generally, have tried to
reconcile the inconsisten t elements between competition and cooperation in vari
ous ways.

Young college graduates entering a large firm or government ministry

compete intensively , yet on a friendly basis, with other new entrants--b ut do
not compete with slightly older persons who entered earlier.

All will advance

at least to a middle level, over 10-15 years, on virtually a straight seniority
basis; a younger person will virtually never be promoted over the head of some
one older.

But within his group (referred to as the

vidual strives to be best.

11

entering class") an indi

His rewards are not faster promotion and higher

salaries, but are more interesting and influential jobs, and the opportunity
to be promoted eventually into the ranks of top management.

The individual

working in a large firm seldom quits to move to a new firm (unless it is an
affiliate); his idenitty with his original hirer is strong and pervasive; he
views the organizatio n as both fighting and cooperating with the world.
The firm acts the same way.
in the same industry.

It is highly competitive with other firms

It places great value on enhancing, or at least main

taining, market share and its size ranking in the industry, as already noted.
At the same time firms are willing to cooperate, when it seems mutually
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indu stry :

in deal ing with othe r in

dus trie s, with the gove rnme nt, or with fore
ign com petit ion at home or abro ad.
Firm s are more like ly to coop erat e, in cart
el arra ngem ents , in rece ssio n peri ods
of stre ss. They agre e to rest rict prod ucti
on in orde r to keep pric es from de
clin ing too much, and perh aps to rest rict new
inve stme nt. Yet even then coop era
tion does not always win over com peti tion .
Of anti -rec essi on cart els esta b
lish ed (typ ical ly with MIT I's enco urag emen
t and bles sing ) only abou t one- third
have effe ctiv ely rest rict ed prod ucti on and
main taine d pric es, for anot her thirQ
the resu lts are amb iguo us, and in the rema
ining thir d firm s in fact did not ad
here to the agre emen ts rest rict ing outp ut,
so that pric es fell and the cart els
were a fail ure. Duri ng booms firm s are less
like ly to coop erate so much with
each othe r. Agg ressi ve firm s, not quit e at
the top of the heap , hope to in
crea se mark et shar e. They are unw illin g to
part icip ate in indu stry- wide agre e
men ts to coor dina te and limi t the ove rall
expa nsio n of capa city (acc ordi ng to
some fixe d rate of new inve stme nt base d on
hist oric rela tive size of firm ) to
anti cipa ted futu re tota l mark et size on the
grou nds that they would ther eby
be lock ed into thei r pres ent rela tive posi
tion .
Ano ther reas on for lack of ove rall busi ness
unit y is that on many issu es
vari ous indu strie s have inte rest s that fund
ame ntall y con flict with each othe r.
For exam ple, cert ain indu strie s want to impo
rt chea p mac hine ry, or inte rme diat e
good s, whil e Japa nese prod ucer s of thes e good
s quit e natu rally disl ike such
fore ign com petit ion. Sim ilar con flic ts exis
t with in pure ly dom estic mark ets.
Ther e are also con flict s betw een big busi ness
and sma ll, and between busi ness
(whi ch would like larg e impo rts of chea p food
to hold down pric es and unio n
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and agric ultur e.

A furth er sourc e of conf lict withi n the big busin ess
secto r is the re
emergence and stren gthen ing of comp eting busin ess 11
group s 11 encom passi ng affil i
ated firms in minin g, manu factu ring, commerce and finan
ce. Supe rfici ally these
appea r susp iciou sly like the prew ar zaiba tsu, and indee
d some of the group s
have fami liar names: Mits ui, Mits ubish i, Sumitomo,
(but Fuji inste ad of its
Yasuda prede cesso r). Group member firms buy from,
sell to, and finan ce each
other ; members joint ly parti cipa te in estab lishi ng
new enter prise s in newly de
velop ing field s. The group s vigor ously compete with
each other acros s a wide
range of indu stria l secto rs.
A group diffe rs sign ifica ntly from a prew ar zaiba tsu
in that a singl e
famil y no longe r owns or other wise cont rols, no centr
alize d holdi ng company
exis ts, stock owne rship is wide ly diffu sed, and contr
ol is typic ally in the
hands of management. Cons equen tly each firm is imme
asura bly more indep enden t
than in the prewa r case. Deci sions are not made from
a sing le, highe r autho r
ity. The presi dents of the main firms in the group
meet regu larly to solve
probl ems of mutu al conce rn; simi lar arran geme nts exist
for lower staff leve ls.
Conf licts among firms are not easil y resol ved. Often
an arbit ratio n comm ittee
is estab lishe d usua lly chair ed by the head of the bank
in the group . It tries
to reach a reaso nable compromise; other wise a disco
ntent ed firm migh t cons ider
pulli ng out of the group . This is of cours e more true
of those firms more et
the perip hery than the core of the group .
Simi lar plur alist ic featu res are char acter istic of
the government burea u
cracy and the polit ical parti es. Government mini strie
s have a tradi tion of
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conside~abl e autonomy and independenc e of views, and are jealous of their powers.
Different ministries frequently have quite different views on specific policies,
deriving from a complex of different goals, ways of thinking, and perceptions
of what their respective constituenc ies are, together with needs of these con
stituencies .

For example, the Bank of Japan appears to place considerabl e em

phasis on price stability, the l.finistry of Finance on the restraint of budgetary
expenditure s to the level of revenues, MITI on expansion of industrial produc
tion and improvement in productivit y, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
en improvement of agricultura l incomes (by expansion of production, restriction
of ir:iports and hisher prices to farmers), and the Economic Planning Agency on
stable growth and efficient resource allocation.
are often e,t loggerheads .

Not surprisingl y ministries

Even within ministries there are different groups-

often based on personaliti es and internal politics as well as on alternative
views on policy.

For example, MITI is often regarded as monolithica lly pro

tectionist end favoring dirigisme, cartels, and industrial concentrati on and
planning; yet one group within MITI view the virtues of relatively free, mar
ket-oriente d competition in increasing output and quality, improving productive
efficiency, ond holding dmm prices as more than compensatin g for the costs of
possible excess capacity and other alleged costs of "excess competition ."
The plurnlisn of the Liberal-Dem ocratic Party derives in large part from
its division into a series of competing factions, which combine and recombine
with each other in order to achieve and maintain power:

the holding of the

party presidency and hence prime ministershi p, and of important party offices
and Cabinet posts.

The factions share a common overall ideological and policy
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framework (alignment with the United States, the emphasis on economic growth in
domestic and foreign policy) , while differing somewhat on certain specific issuc;s.
Factions have fomed around leaders based on personality, long personal ties, and
the ability of the leader to obtain funds to finance the election campaigns and
ether activities of members of the faction.

In addition to heavy contributions

to the LDP and its central fund-raising organization, many big enterprises make
contributions to selected specific factions or individuals.

Thus, competition

among industries or business groups, and among LDP factions, tend to spill over
and reinforce each other.
Yet the LDP is not simply the captive of big business--it cannot afford to
be.

While much of its financing comes from large business contributions it must

seek elsewhere for sufficient votes to remain in power.

Thus, it has to shape

policies so as to help, or at least ameliorate conditions for farmers, small
businessmen, white collar workers, professionals, and workers (particularly
those who are not militantly organized by unions).

Moreover, while retaining

control of the parliament, the LDP has to provide reasonable alternatives to
the policy positions of the opposition parties.
While business is tied to the LDP, unions and their member workers in
larger enterprises have consistently supported the parties to the left.

SOHYO

(General Council of Trade Unions), the largest labor confederation, has been
the mainstay of the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party.

(The

JSP too is split into factions; they are based both on personalities and ide
ology).

More middle-of-the-road unions support the moderate Democratic Social

ist Party, while a few more extreme unions support the small Japan Communist
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Komeito (Clean Government Party) is the political organ of Sokka Gakkai,

a fundamenta list Buddhist sect which has grown considerabl y in the past decade.
Its supporters belong to no clearly identifiabl e organized economic group; gen
erally they are urban, relatively lower income, working in small establishme nts
or housewives, somewhat alienated.
All this suggests that the Japanese economic and business environment has
evolved in ways considerabl y at variance from that envisaged by the SCAP re
formers.

The main differences lie in only partial acceptance of competition ,

and relatively greater acceptance of direct government influence on business
decisions.

Anti-monopo ly provisions were substantial ly weakened soon after the

end of the Occupation, and have eroded further since then, though LDP attempts
at further legislative easing in the late 1950's and early 1960's were blocked
by widespread opposition.

Nonetheless , interlockin g directorshi ps and stock

ownership is once more permitted.

More important, anti-recess ion production

and other cartels have been made legal, subject to MITI and the Fair Trade Com
mission.

The latter has been relatively weak, unable really to restrain the

trends toward restriction of competition .
Concomitan tly, there has been a gradual trend in many industries of in
creasing concentratio n of production to a relatively small number of large
firms.

Following the SCAP deconcentra tion efforts, Japanese industry in the

1950's was certainly less concentrate d than prewar, and no more concentrate d
than in the United States.

Concentrati on was even lessened somewhat by the

rapid growth of new firms.

Since the late 1950's however, the trend has re

versed:

the top three, five or ten firms are gaining an increasing share of
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Sinc e the mid 1960 1 s the tend ency has acce
lera ted due to the
incr easi ng number of merg ers among larg e firm
s in majo r indu strie s. This tren d,
toge ther with the grow th of grou ps of affi liat
ed firm s, sugg ests an incr easi ng
conc entr atio n of economic pow er--t houg h far
less than that of the 1930 1 s.

Two fact ors miti gate the adve rse effe cts of incr
easi ng conc entr atio n of
the indu stria l stru ctur e.

Firs t, inte nse com petit ion pers ists among firm
s in

a give n indu stry , and among grou ps.

This is refl ecte d in rath er subs tant ial

changes in the rela tive rank ing of the top
ten firm s in any indu stry . Seco nd,
where the government has tole rate d or enco
urag ed rest rict ions of com peti tion ,
it has put pres sure on firm s to improve prod
ucti vity , cut cost s, and redu ce-
or at leas t not incr ease -•-p rice s. This has
been poss ible beca use incr easi ng
conc entr atio n has been a cons eque nce in part
of economies of very larg e-sc ale
prod uctio n.

IV.

The Futu re

The Japa nese phoe nix, revi taliz ed and stro nger
than ever , has soar ed high .
Can it cont inue to fly so well ? Which way
will it fly? Phra sed more pros aica lly,
will Japa n's economic grow th cont inue unab
ated ? Will the prim acy of economic
growth in dom estic and fore ign poli cy obje ctiv
es pers ist, or will new goal s be
come more impo rtan t?
It is beyond the scop e (or leng th) of this
essa y to anal yze thes e ques tion s
in deta il. The odds are high (per haps 70 perc
ent) that the economy will cont inue
to grow over the coming deca de at an aver age
annu al rate of at leas t 6-8 per
cent , prob ably somewhat slow er than the past
deca de's supe r-pe rform ance .

Inv est me nt and sav ing s rat es
wi ll rem ain a hig h pro por tio n
of GNP, tho ugh not
inc rea sin g as in the pa st. Fo
rei gn tec hn olo gic al inf low wi
ll con tin ue; eve n
tho ugh much of the cream has
bee n skimmed. Domestic inn ova
tio n, and pa rti cu lar ly
the dif fus ion of adv anc ed tec
hno log y among a lar ge r number
of firm s and pro 
po rtio n of the lab or for ce, wi
ll become rel ati ve ly more im por
tan t. Labor sup ply ,
wh ile tig hte nin g, wi ll rem ain
more ample tha n in Eu rop e, pa
rti cu lar ly as the
ins tit uti on al pra cti ces of lar
ge firm s hir ing onl y new sch
ool gra dua tes and re
tir ing em plo yee s at 55 ero de.
Ag ric ult ure wi ll con sti tut e
a ma jor pro ble m are a,
bu t its rel ati ve imp ort anc e-now les s tha n 20 per cen t of
lab or for ce and 12 per 
cen t of GN P-- wil l con tin ue to
dim ini sh.
Wh ile the pre dom ina nt sha re of
thi s gro wth in out put and inc
omes wi ll be
use d to inc rea se pri vat e con sum
ptio n and to pro vid e the inv est
me nt fue l for
fur the r sus tai ned gro wth , a ris
ing ma rgi n wi ll be ava ila ble
for oth er use s.
Th ese res our ces are lik ely to
be all oca ted to the improvem
ent of hou sin g, roa ds,
wa ter and sewage sys tem s, and
oth er pub lic ser vic es.
Jap an' s res urg enc e to the for
efr on t of wo rld ind ust ria l na
tio ns- -th ird now
in tot al GNP beh ind the Un ited
Sta tes and Ru ssi a, tho ugh con
sid era bly low er in
per cap ita ran kin g-- has giv en
the peo ple a renewed sel f-c onf
ide nce and nat ion al
pri de. Yet Jap an' s int ern ati
on al po lit ica l inf lue nce , its
ran kin g as a wo rld
pow er, lag beh ind . Mo reo ver
, to many Jap ane se it app ear s
tha t the cou ntr y doe s
not hav e suf fic ien t ind epe nde
nce . In par t thi s lie s in the
ear lie r rea lit ies
of the bi- po lar col d wa r, whe
n Jap an as a weak nat ion qu ite
na tur all y ali gne d
its elf wit h the Un ited Sta tes
and rel ied upon the .American
nuc lea r um bre lla to
pro vid e Jap an' s sec uri ty from
ext ern al agg res sio n. Thu s, the
re is und er way
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, and the ask
ing of new questi ons (for the postwa r period ). What should be Japan
's future
world role? How can greate r indepe ndence be achiev ed, and at the
same time
nation al securi ty guaran teed?
No consen sus is yet discer nible in the emergi ng debate on these
and re
lated issues .

In rather cautio us ways the government has tried to develo p a

somewhat more positi ve foreig n policy , partic ularly in the econom
ic sphere .
It has substa ntiall y increa sed its economic aid to less develo ped
count ries,
partic ularly in Asia.

It has attemp ted to media te in variou s dispu tes, par

ticula rly among Asian nation s, so far withou t notabl e succes s.
The issue of nation al securi ty most starkl y deline ates these new
develo p
ments within Japan. The issue is in flux still, with neithe r goals
nor means
of achiev ing them fully articu lated. The extrem ely strong pacif
ist feelin g,
a contin uing conseq uence of World War II, remain s an impor tant factor
, though
appare ntly affect ing the postwa r young genera tion less than those
who went
throug h the war. Severa l altern ative approa ches are under debate
. One, the
policy of the LDP, is to maint ain the presen t milita ry allian ce
with the United
States , while obtain ing greate r indepe ndence from U.S. contro ls
on smalle r mat
ters, and redefi ning the Japan- U.S. partne rship in more equal terms.
This
would allow Japan to use its resour ces for domes tic growth and foreig
n aid and
invest ment. But will it be indepe ndent enough? How indepe ndent
can a nation
be in today 's world? And bow about the U.S. cornmitment--how will
American
post-V ietnam securi ty policy evolve ?
The Japan Socia list Party has taken a compl etely differ ent positi
on:
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neutra lism withou t milita ry power.
be friend ly with all nation s.

Japan should align itself with no bloc, but

No one will want to attack Japan, so it is not

necess ary to have a defens ive milita ry force.

Secur ity can be guaran teed by an

intern ationa l pact signed by the United States , Russia , and China.
seems no eviden ce that such a pact is feasib le.

Yet there

More impor tant, is Japan wil

ling to lie defen seless , depend ing solely on the good will of other
nation s?
Isn't the risk too high for Japan 's own nation al intere sts?
A third altern ative- -neutr alism with securi ty guaran teed by Japan
's own
milita ry forces --has a strong {thoug h by no means overwh elming )
logic.

It

however has not yet really entere d the debate becaus e a major premis
e is that
Japan would have its own nuclea r armaments. This at presen t remain
s anathema
to most Japane se. Nonet heless , if Japane se nation alism takes the
path of com
plete indepe ndence (and semi- isolat ionism ), and if some extern al
threat to
Japan 's securi ty is clearl y and strong ly percei ved, it is quite
possib le that
this altern ative could evolve from the positi ons of either the left
or the
right.

As it happen s, atomic weaponing and delive ry system s are well within

Japan 's techn ical and economic capac ity.

Policy maker s have kept the choice s

open, pushin g the develo pment of atomic energy for peace ful uses,
and the
develo pment of missil es and guidan ce system s for basic space resear
ch.

An

alloca tion of perhap s 5 percen t of GNP per year for five years should
provid e
Japan a moder ately sophi sticat ed nuclea r weapons system .

This could be where

the extra margin of resour ces from growth will go.
Japan 's single -mind ed and highly succe ssful pursu it, since the end
of
World War II, of economic recon struct ion and growth of produ ction
and improv e-
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ment in living standards is clear and noteworth y.

It seems unlikely that Japan's

future goals will be so overwhelm ingly dominated by economic growth.

But to

what extent will economic objective s--growth , greater social welfare, improve
ment of public services- -continue to be predomina nt?
creasingl y seek other goals?

Or will the nation in

If so, how will it try to achieve them?

These

issues make Japan an exciting and important country to watch in the coming cru
cial decade.
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